George Packer and "The Assassin's Gate"

As it happens, I have just finished a book called "The Assassin's Gate" by the very same author of the New Yorker article sent to me by Jamison. Read the link to that article in Jamison's comments to the previous post to understand more. George Packer is a truly moderate Democrat (I am using the word "moderate" to mean in the middle of right skewed range of American political thought). He was in Manhatten when the World Trade Center was brought down and fled down the street covered in ash. He supported the invasion of Iraq on the hope that it would improve the life of Iraqis. He believes in the right of all persons to live under a just system of law. He appears to give the benefit of the doubt to every person with whom he speaks, and that may reveal a certain naivete on his part of a particular form of Western liberalism. Like many others he believes that the trouble with Iraq has everything to do with an inadequate post war plan (or any plan) and he details how this came to be in stirring, well written, and intelligent reporting. He has spoke with many, many of the archetects of the war and does a fantastic job of explaining their thinking. He spent a great deal of time in Iraq speaking with Iraqis and American soldiers and it is clear that much of his belief in the general goodness of the cause seems to be linked to the hope that lives of these people will someday be improved, or at least, not lost in vain. He also poses some very difficult questions to the antiwar movement, and is equally critical of the total cultural ignorance of American conservatives and, indeed, the war planners themselves.

Still, as in Jamison noted regarding the New Yorker article, he wears blinders that shut out certain complexities and or de-emphasize the warts of American foreign policy as it has been executed in the world. His book mentions WMDs and Democracy as part of the administrations shifting rationale for the invasion, but never oil. Never does he discuss the strategic interest that was to be gained from the US successfully executing their war plan. This is particularly interesting given his comments on the history of the American right and left concerning using the military in far off places.

Packer argues that the Right had traditionally been isolationist and held that position that We ought only to enter into wars when it a "vital interest" was at stake--in other words, Only War for Oil. The Left, on the other hand, spoke of humanitarian ideals that the US must uphold (when they ever acted on these with consistency and without there also being a "vital interest" is beyond me but let's grant the thesis for a moment as it has some merit insofar as the base of both wings did believe this about themselves to some degree). The Neo-Cons, former liberals who believed in the virtue of the Vietnam War, went Right with their disgust with the Left's fringe and the anti-war movement. They found a hero in Reagan who spoke of America in the Puritanical language of a "shining city on a hill" --the beacon of hope to the tired and weary world (oh come let us adore it). They were disappointed by George Bush The Competent's pragmatism, and frustrated when he refused to take out Saddam in '91. With Clinton, they saw a man who was willing to use US power in far off places for somewhat humanitarian reasons (though not pure of heart, to be sure) though only Wolfowitz was able to support these efforts while others simply could not support anything that Clinton pursued. The majority of the Right returned to their isolationist roots and argued against Bosnia and Somalia saying that the US had "no dog" in those fights (this is arguably untrue). The neo-cons held out and were somehow put in the most key positions in the administation of the George Bush The Hapless in spite of his campaigning in 2000 against an aggressive, far reaching foreign policy (he said that under him the US would be "humble"). Then came 9/11 and the neo-cons took over from there.

The Left has had to deal with the difficult question as to the nature of America's foreign policy and they haven't yet come up with an answer. What do we want the role of the US to be? Should we intervene often? To what degree? Can we do this effectively? I have thought that removing Saddam was a possibly fantastic goal, but never trusted the Right to do it well, nor the country to do it without expecting a loyal client in return--that has been the practice of history. I've read too much about colonialism to believe that a nation would spend so much without expecting a lot in return. Does that mean that the lives of Iraqis cannot be improved as well? No, but it does mean that our intentions are not what we say they are, and that is something that those who do not benefit from the quid pro quo arrangement understand full well--and there we lose credibility because we are not credible. Does that mean I want a tyrant to remain in charge? Of course not. There are no easy answers. Still, I maintain that one cannot claim to be a beacon of righteousness unless one is truly righteous, and we are not truly righteous, and we very seldom, if ever, try to be.